Strait of Hormuz: Situation, Oil Transit Volumes and Logistics Impact
Active conflict zone: transit conditions, premiums and prices can change daily. This page documents the editorially verified status as of the date shown — for operational decisions, consult UKMTO/JMIC warnings and carrier advisories.
Oil transit through the Strait of Hormuz (H1 2025, normal operations)
Equivalent to about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption
Source: EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints, 20257-day average Hormuz clearance through 13 Oct 2026
Kpler briefing of 15 Oct: 11.617 million b/d, about 68% of the 17.145 million baseline. Single days swing widely and are floors. Transit excluding Iranian-origin vessels on 13 Oct: 4.5 million b/d, 7-day average 9.2 million. The BBC cites about 12.6 million b/d for 13 Oct, below 15 million at the end of September. September stays separate: 9.9 million confirmed through the strait. Tanker crossings: a 7-day average of 13 against 50 before the war.
Source: Kpler media briefing (15 Oct 2026); BBC (Kpler, 13 Oct), 2026Last published war-risk range per transit (no newer quote as of 18 Oct)
VLCC cover sometimes exceeds USD 10 million per transit. ENOC (9 Sept): transit costs often USD 10–20m including cargo. Pre-war: ~0.25% (approx. USD 250,000).
Source: Lloyd's List / trade press (July–Aug 2026), 2026Pipeline bypass capacity — Yanbu still had VLCCs on 10–12 Oct
Structurally 3.5–5 million b/d. Kpler briefing of 15 Oct: satellite images show VLCCs at Yanbu and Juaymah on 10–12 Oct. No new date for full Petroline repairs; the last range was 4–6 weeks from 27 Sept. Habshan–Fujairah remains. Qatar LNG has no bypass. Products through the strait: the last sourced figure is still Guardian/Kpler of 1 Oct (below 20%, 677,000 b/d).
Source: IEA, 2025Operational status & cost factors (as of 18 October 2026)
| Factor | Status / value | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Passage / transit traffic | High risk, no normal reopening. Kpler through 13 Oct: 7-day clearance 11.6 million b/d, about 68% of the baseline. Tanker crossings averaged 13 a day over 7 days, against 50 before the war. On 13 Oct, four exits and no entries — a floor. September remains 9.9 million b/d confirmed through the strait. | Volatile |
| War-risk insurance | Still ~7.5–10% of hull value per transit; VLCC sometimes > USD 10m. ENOC (9 Sept): transit costs often USD 10–20m. Pre-war: ~0.25%. | Volatile |
| Security / incidents | BBC/UKMTO: twelve reported attacks from 5 to 11 Oct, ten the week before. IMO/CNBC: eleven tankers in the week to 4 Oct. Kpler: all 32 crossings from 10 to 13 Oct dark or on an unknown route. The counts are floors, because many ships do not report. The US blockade of Iranian ports remains in force. | Volatile |
| Sanctions / compliance risk | OFAC (24 Aug): Operation Economic Outcast — nearly 60 listings; sectors shipping, aviation, gold, technology, digital assets. Warning on Hormuz passage and Iranian insurance services. Iran: non-compliant list of around 45–46 ships (detention/confiscation, STS contagion). | Volatile |
| Pipeline bypass | East-West restarted after the 10–11 Sept attack. Kpler briefing of 15 Oct: VLCCs were still at Yanbu and Juaymah on 10–12 Oct. No new completion date; the last range was 4–6 weeks from 27 Sept. Habshan–Fujairah remains. Qatar LNG has no bypass. | Volatile |
| Diplomatic process | No reopening. Kpler: talks resumed on 22 Sept; Washington rejected an Iranian offer to reopen the strait within 7 days if the blockade were lifted. NYT (2 Oct, Eurasia Group): a standoff, neither side is moving. More oil is not a peace signal. | Volatile |
| Energy price impact | Guardian (1 Oct): Brent briefly back above USD 100, up 3% to about USD 101. April peak ~USD 126. UK diesel hit a record 199.18 pence a litre on 28 Sept — refined products through Hormuz remain below 20% of pre-war, per Kpler. More crude does not mean cheaper diesel. | Volatile |
Snapshot of an active conflict — values can change daily. Trackers (MarineTraffic, JMIC, PortWatch) diverge; ranges, not false precision. Authoritative: UKMTO, IMO and flag states.
Why the Strait of Hormuz cannot be replaced
The strait between Oman and Iran connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It is deep and wide enough for the world’s largest crude tankers (VLCCs) and concentrates the exports of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Iran. In 2025, an average of around 20 million barrels of oil per day passed through — about 20% of global consumption and a quarter of seaborne oil trade (EIA/IEA). Add around one fifth of global LNG trade, almost entirely from Qatar.
Bypass options are structurally limited — and additionally interrupted in September 2026: the Saudi East-West pipeline was shut after the 10–11 Sept drone attack and has been loading at Yanbu again since 27 Sept. Kpler still saw VLCCs there on 10–12 Oct; no new completion date has been published. The last range was 4–6 weeks from 27 Sept. The UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah pipeline stayed open. Together the two systems structurally offered an estimated 3.5–5 million b/d — a fraction of transit volumes. In September, 40% of regional crude bypassed the strait, against 17% before. Qatar’s LNG has no bypass. Any disruption immediately affects global energy prices, freight rates and insurance costs.
Seven phases of the crisis (2026 trajectory)
1) Blockade from 28 Feb 2026: transit collapses, insurers withdraw, DFC reinsurance (March) enables partial flows. 2) MoU/negotiation window from 17 June: brief recovery that does not hold. 3) July escalation: renewed tanker attacks, US strikes, war-risk 7.5–10%. 4) August diplomacy without physical normalisation: 60-day window expired around 18 Aug; UKMTO 115-26. 5) Late August: OFAC Operation Economic Outcast, Iranian non-compliant list. 6) September: shuttle traffic and pipelines lift crude volumes; East-West goes down on 11 Sept and restarts late in the month. 7) Early October: regional exports excluding Iran at pre-war levels, the passage still under attack, products and insurance not normalised.
For forwarders and shippers the trajectory matters: reading only the current snapshot underestimates how often "near-reopening" diplomacy and physical closure alternate. Operational decisions need UKMTO/JMIC primary sources and day-fresh carrier advisories — not headlines alone.
What the crisis means for forwarders and shippers
Directly affected are trades to and from Gulf ports (Jebel Ali, Dammam, Hamad, Kuwait, Bandar Abbas): carriers levy war-risk surcharges, cancel sailings or serve only ports outside the strait (e.g. Fujairah, Salalah, Duqm, Khor Fakkan). Bookings need longer lead times; hull insurers sometimes require day-by-day clearance.
Indirectly, the crisis hits virtually every supply chain via energy prices: BAF rises with oil, air freight via jet fuel, energy-intensive inputs pass on costs. For Gulf trades: review war/strike clauses, force majeure and price-adjustment clauses.
Operationally (18 October 2026): the 7-day clearance through 13 Oct averaged 11.6 million b/d, about 68% of the pre-war baseline. That is not a normal booking. BBC/UKMTO count twelve reported attacks from 5 to 11 Oct. Yanbu still had VLCCs on 10–12 Oct; no new repair date has been published. The last products figure through the strait remains that of 1 Oct. War risk: last published range 7.5–10% of hull value, no newer quote as of 18 Oct. Since 24 Aug a sailing check is no longer enough: vessel and IMO number, owner, operator, charterer, consignee, banks and involved service providers should be screened — especially after last-minute vessel switches, ship-to-ship transfers and unusual payment routes. OFAC recommends enhanced screening of ships transiting Hormuz.
Where to find reliable situation updates
For operational decisions, primary sources matter: UKMTO (security warnings), JMIC (threat assessments), IMO (regulatory), EIA/IEA (transit/capacity data). AIS trackers and live pages give fast signals but diverge — always check against UKMTO/JMIC and carrier advisories. In an active conflict, figures become outdated within days.
Timeline: phases of the Hormuz crisis 2025–2026
Precursor · Twelve-day Israel-Iran air war
Already in 2025, war-risk premiums and reroutings showed how sensitively the strait reacts to escalation.
Phase 1 · War begins — near-total blockade
After US-Israeli strikes against Iran, transit collapses: Brent jumps 10–13%, EU gas prices briefly double; vessel movements fall by more than 90%.
P&I clubs cancel war-risk extensions
Leading insurers withdraw; at times more than 1,000 vessels are stuck inside the Gulf. Premiums reach 1–5% of hull value.
US launches USD 20bn maritime reinsurance programme
The DFC programme (lead: Chubb) assumes hull, liability and cargo risks for eligible transits, enabling a partial resumption of oil flows.
Phase 2 · US-Iran MoU: 60-day negotiation window
Both sides agree to negotiate a durable arrangement; transit traffic recovers temporarily — the window does not hold.
Phase 3 · Renewed escalation: tanker attacks, US strikes, renewed closure
Iran resumes tanker attacks, the US responds with strikes. In mid-July Iran announces the strait closed again; war-risk premiums reach 3–10% and concentrate at 7.5–10%.
AIS low: only 29 verified crossings in three days
MarineTraffic 24–26 July: 29 crossings. Estimates including AIS-off then ~30–40/day — later in August even lower.
Oman/GCC plan: voluntary transit fees; new Iranian threats
Oman delivers a GCC-backed joint-management plan (no Iranian sole control). Formal Iranian acceptance does not follow; the plan is overtaken in August by Tehran’s new conditions.
Phase 4 · Tanker attacks off Oman; diplomacy under fire
Two tankers are hit off Oman near the strait (one carrying gas). The physical situation remains highly volatile despite deal hopes.
Iran–Oman: draft agreement in "final stages" — no opening without US clearance
Coordinates for a transit route through Omani and Iranian waters are largely agreed; Tehran stresses the strait stays closed until Washington addresses sanctions, reparations and the blockade.
ADNOC tanker attack; JMIC "severe" / UKMTO 108-26
UAE accuses Iran of a missile strike on an ADNOC vessel (no injuries, return to Fujairah). JMIC: 84 incidents since 1 March; on 8 Aug only 8 cargo + 2 tankers; attack "highly likely".
Iran ties reopening to US concessions; oil prices rise
FM Araghchi: Iran–Oman near an agreement, but no reopening without US steps (sanctions, reparations). UKMTO: transit in the week to 7 Aug at ~4% of pre-war levels.
Mid-August attack wave: ADNOC tankers and bulk carriers
Several UAV and projectile hits on tankers and bulk carriers, including ADNOC vessels. JMIC keeps the threat at "severe"; traffic remains heavily suppressed.
60-day window ends; UKMTO 115-26 (crew casualty near Khasab)
No confirmed reopening after the negotiation window expired. UKMTO Warning 115-26: projectile strike outbound near Khasab, engine-room damage, crew casualty; Omani Coast Guard assisting. Commercial transit remains suppressed.
UKMTO VRA overview: AIS transits ~90% below pre-conflict
Official UKMTO overview (produced 21 Aug): AIS-detected transits about 90% below pre-conflict baselines and declining since the 24–26 Jun peak. Southern Omani route remains the highest-risk corridor (16 of 18 projectile strikes since 6 Jul). JMIC still "severe"; IMO TSS still suspended. No confirmed reopening.
Weekend low: 13 + 4 commodity transits
Kpler (preliminary): Saturday 13, Sunday 4 commodity transits — after 16 on Friday. AIS figures can understate dark transits. UKMTO week to 21 Aug: 89 exits, 103 entries; AIS still ~90% below pre-war.
Iran lists around 45–46 ships as non-compliant
Iran’s “Persian Gulf Strait Authority” publishes a non-compliant list (sources: 45 or 46 ships, including ADNOC, Bahri, Nakilat, Navig8, Stolt, Sinokor). Threat: fines, detention, confiscation; STS with listed ships can also trigger listing.
OFAC launches Operation Economic Outcast
US Treasury: nearly 60 persons, firms and vessels newly listed; sectoral determinations for shipping, aviation, gold, technology and digital assets. OFAC expressly warns of sanctions risk on Hormuz transit and Iranian passage or insurance services.
UKMTO VRA: AIS still ~90% below pre-war; overall ~20% including US-facilitated
Official overview (produced 4 Sept): AIS transits still about 90% below pre-conflict. Southern Omani route highest risk. JMIC "severe". 27 projectile strikes since 6 Jul. No diplomatic resolution. gCaptain (11 Sept, UKMTO): week 108 outbound + 102 inbound including US-facilitated passage (~20 vessels/day southern route vs ~6 AIS).
East-West pipeline shut after drone attack
Drone attack 10–11 Sept on Saudi Petroline (Abqaiq–Yanbu). Reuters (17 Sept): three pumping stations hit; precautionary shutdown. The main Hormuz bypass is therefore temporarily out. Aramco is building an emergency bypass; full repairs on a weeks-scale. Habshan–Fujairah remains. CNBC: Brent reported above USD 100.
Only 3 commodity transits in one day (Kpler/Reuters)
Reuters (17 Sept): only three commodity ships on 16 Sept — after 12 the day before, below the 10-day average of ~17. Figures exclude AIS-off. Shows that US-facilitated partial flows do not replace stable commercial passage. JMIC still "severe".
Talks resume; US rejects a 7-day reopening
Kpler: talks resumed on 22 Sept. Washington rejected an Iranian offer to reopen the strait within 7 days if the US blockade were lifted. Iranian transits have stayed near zero since July.
East-West/Yanbu loading again
Kpler briefing of 15 Oct: satellite images still showed VLCCs at Yanbu and Juaymah on 10–12 Oct. No new date for a full Petroline repair has been published. The bypass is carrying oil again, but it does not replace the strait.
Three tankers hit in the strait
Reuters/Marisks (1 Oct): on 29 Sept the Liberian tankers Al Ruwais, Mersin Prosperity and Sinbad were hit by projectiles. They were sailing with AIS switched off. Higher throughput has not ended the attack risk.
Regional crude excluding Iran at pre-war level, products are not
Guardian/Kpler (1 Oct): at least 16.5 million b/d of crude left the region in September, matching the pre-war average excluding Iran. Refined products through the strait remain below 20% (7-day average 677,000 b/d against 3.6 million). Brent briefly around USD 101. Lloyd’s List: more oil means accepted complexity, not safety.
Highest weekly tanker-attack count since the war began
IMO via CNBC (9 Oct): eleven tankers attacked in the week to 4 Oct, the most since late February. Five more the following week. Kpler says Iran has loaded no crude since late August.
Clearance falls as attacks and dark traffic rise
Kpler briefing of 15 Oct: 7-day clearance through 13 Oct averaged 11.6 million b/d, about 68% of the 17.1 million baseline. On 13 Oct, four exits and no entries. All 32 crossings from 10 to 13 Oct were dark or on an unknown route. That evening the Aramco headquarters in Dhahran caught fire, with no injuries and no direct effect on oil volumes. BBC: about 12.6 million b/d on 13 Oct — a different series from the confirmed daily transit.
Latest news on this topic
All news22 Oct 2026
Hormuz: Low Vessel Traffic and Significant Intelligence Gaps
UKMTO reports 254 Hormuz transits in seven days. The figures are partially unverified, and many attacked vessels do not report incidents directly.
21 Oct 2026
Hormuz: Report Describes New Attack Tactics Against Vessels
Reuters reports on altered Iranian attack tactics in the Hormuz region. For affected shipments, security situation and travel confirmation remain critical factors.
29 Sept 2026
Cargo Vessel 'Cape Dao' Catches Fire Following Attack in Strait of Hormuz
An attack on the 'Cape Dao' highlights the high risk in the Strait of Hormuz. Shippers and freight forwarders face the threat of service disruptions, increased costs, and delays.
23 Sept 2026
Hormuz: Only Four Cargo Ships Registered in a Single Day
Only four cargo ships were registered in the Strait of Hormuz on that day. Due to disabled AIS, significantly more vessels may have actually transited.
Next steps
Matching tools and partners
Frequently asked questions
Is the Strait of Hormuz currently closed?›
As of 18 Oct 2026: not closed in law, but not a normal commercial route. The 7-day clearance through 13 Oct averaged 11.6 million b/d, about 68% of the pre-war baseline. The confirmed day of 13 Oct is a floor and is not the same figure as the BBC’s 12.6 million b/d. September remains 9.9 million b/d through the strait. For the voyage, UKMTO/JMIC and carrier advisories govern, not a single barrel count.
When will the Strait of Hormuz reopen?›
Not confirmed. In its 15 Oct briefing Kpler assumes a slower recovery without a comprehensive deal. The 7-day clearance through 13 Oct was about 68% of the pre-war baseline, and attacks have tightened. The last published war-risk range remains 7.5–10%.
How much oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz?›
Under normal operations (H1 2025), an average of 20.9 million barrels per day according to the EIA — around 20% of global consumption. In September 2026 Kpler counts at least 16.5 million b/d of regional crude exports excluding Iran, matching the pre-war average excluding Iran. Confirmed through the strait: 9.9 million b/d — more than a quarter below pre-war transit. JPMorgan is higher, near 13 million b/d; the spread shows that trackers diverge. Iran itself remains largely shut out by the US blockade.
What does war-risk insurance cost for a Hormuz transit?›
Last published range: 7.5–10% of hull value per transit; as of 18 Oct 2026 no newer public broker quote was available. VLCC cover in the summer sometimes exceeded USD 10 million. ENOC (9 Sept): transit costs often USD 10–20m including cargo. Pre-war around 0.25%. Rates can change daily.
Are there alternative routes around the Strait of Hormuz?›
Limited. East-West (Saudi) still had VLCCs at Yanbu on 10–12 Oct; no new completion date has been published. Habshan–Fujairah (UAE) stayed open. Structurally 3.5–5 million b/d — a fraction of ~20 million b/d. No bypass for Qatar LNG. Containers: Fujairah, Salalah, Duqm, Khor Fakkan.
What should forwarders do now on Gulf trades?›
Check UKMTO/JMIC and carrier advisories daily; show war-risk and emergency surcharges transparently in quotes; plan alternate ports outside the strait; update force majeure and war/strike clauses; brief customers on transit-time and price volatility. Screen vessel, IMO, owner, operator, charterer and payment routes against OFAC and the Iranian non-compliant list. No passage without current insurer and carrier clearance.
What sanctions risks apply to a Hormuz transit?›
Since 24 Aug 2026 (OFAC Operation Economic Outcast), payments or services around a Hormuz transit can trigger US sanctions risk — including Iranian passage or insurance services. OFAC newly listed nearly 60 persons, firms and vessels and expanded shipping, aviation, gold, technology and digital-asset sectors. In parallel, Iran threatens listed ships (around 45–46) with detention and confiscation; STS with those ships can also trigger listing. This is not legal advice — OFAC, the flag state and your own compliance are authoritative.
Sources & authoritative references
- OfficialEIA — World Oil Transit Chokepoints
- AuthorityIEA — Strait of Hormuz (Oil Security)
- OfficialUKMTO — Maritime Security Warnings
- OfficialUKMTO — VRA Overview (produced 4 Sept 2026)
- OfficialIMO — Maritime Security
- AuthorityUNCTAD — Review of Maritime Transport
- ReferenceAl Jazeera — Oil prices & Iranian Hormuz demands (10 Aug 2026)
- ReferenceGulf News / JMIC — Hormuz threat severe, ADNOC tanker attack (Aug 2026)
- ReferencegCaptain / Reuters — Iran ties Hormuz reopening to US concessions (10 Aug 2026)
- ReferencegCaptain — ADNOC vessels attacked, Hormuz still severely disrupted (mid-Aug 2026)
- ReferenceThe National — War-Risk Premium Report (17.07.2026)
- ReferenceThe National — Oman steps up Hormuz diplomacy (28.07.2026)
- ReferenceFrachtportal News — Indien: Containerstau und Frachtraten steigen (22.07.2026)
- OfficialUS Treasury — Operation Economic Outcast (24 Aug 2026)
- OfficialOFAC — Hormuz transit sanctions guidance (24 Aug 2026)
- ReferenceReuters / The Hindu — Weekend Hormuz transits (24 Aug 2026)
- ReferencegCaptain — Iran non-compliant vessel list (23 Aug 2026)
- ReferencegCaptain — US-facilitated Hormuz transits, Gulf crude >10 mbd (11 Sept 2026)
- ReferenceReuters — Three pumping stations on Saudi East-West pipeline hit (17 Sept 2026)
- ReferenceReuters — Hormuz commodity transits fall to three (17 Sept 2026)
- ReferenceReuters — ENOC: Hormuz transit costs $10–20m (9 Sept 2026)
- ReferenceKpler — Gulf crude exports back at pre-war levels excluding Iran (data as of 29 Sept 2026)
- ReferenceThe Guardian / Kpler — crude exports and constrained diesel (1 Oct 2026)
- ReferenceNew York Times via The Inquirer — attacks continue as oil flows rise (2 Oct 2026)
- ReferenceReuters / Marisks via CNBC Africa — three tankers hit (1 Oct 2026)
- ReferenceBusiness Times / JPMorgan — Middle East oil flows near pre-war (late Sept 2026)
- ReferenceKpler — media briefing (15 Oct 2026)
- ReferenceBBC — reported attacks near Hormuz and slower oil shipments
- ReferenceCNBC / IMO — tanker attacks in the week to 4 Oct 2026
- ReferenceFrachtportal News — Hormuz praktisch leer, AIS ~90 % unter Normalniveau (25.08.2026)