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Strait of Hormuz: Situation, Oil Transit Volumes and Logistics Impact
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Active conflict zone: transit conditions, premiums and prices can change daily. This page documents the editorially verified status as of the date shown — for operational decisions, consult UKMTO/JMIC warnings and carrier advisories.
20.9million b/d
Oil transit through the Strait of Hormuz (H1 2025, normal operations)
Equivalent to about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption
Source: EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints, 2025~90% below pre-war AIS
UKMTO AIS transits (VRA overview 21 Aug 2026)
AIS-detected transits about 90% below pre-conflict (week to 21 Aug: 89 outbound + 103 inbound). Weekend 22–23 Aug (Kpler, preliminary): 13 and 4 commodity transits; Friday 16. AIS understates dark transits. Week to 7 Aug still ~4% as an earlier comparison.
Source: UKMTO VRA Overview (produced 21 Aug 2026), 20267.5–10% of hull value
War-risk insurance premium per transit (July/August 2026)
VLCC cover sometimes exceeds USD 10 million per transit. Pre-war: ~0.25% (approx. USD 250,000).
Source: Lloyd's List / trade press (July–Aug 2026), 20263.5–5million b/d
Available pipeline bypass capacity (Saudi East-West, Habshan–Fujairah)
Can replace only a fraction of transit volumes — the rest cannot be exported without the strait
Source: IEA, 2025Operational status & cost factors (as of 25 August 2026)
| Factor | Status / value | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Passage / transit traffic | Commercially effectively blocked / high-risk. UKMTO week to 21 Aug: 89 outbound + 103 inbound, AIS ~90% below pre-war. Weekend 22–23 Aug (Kpler): 13 Sat + 4 Sun commodity transits (Fri 16). AIS understates dark transits. Pre-crisis: ~130–140/day. | Volatile |
| War-risk insurance | Still ~7.5–10% of hull value per transit; VLCC sometimes > USD 10m. Pre-war: ~0.25%. | Volatile |
| Security / incidents | JMIC: threat "severe", attack "highly likely". UKMTO: 23 projectile/damage incidents since 6 Jul; UKMTO 115-26 (18 Aug, crew casualty near Khasab). Mine/GNSS risks. | Volatile |
| Sanctions / compliance risk | OFAC (24 Aug): Operation Economic Outcast — nearly 60 listings; sectors shipping, aviation, gold, technology, digital assets. Warning on Hormuz passage and Iranian insurance services. Iran: non-compliant list of around 45–46 ships (detention/confiscation, STS contagion). | Volatile |
| Pipeline bypass | East-West + Habshan–Fujairah: estimated 3.5–5 million b/d available — a fraction of normal volumes; Qatar LNG has no bypass | In force |
| Diplomatic process | 60-day window expired around 18 Aug — no confirmed reopening. Oman/Iran talks reported on 21 Aug, without a confirmed opening. Iran still ties opening to US concessions. | Volatile |
| Energy price impact | Brent volatile in August (early Aug ~USD 80–87/bbl; April peak ~USD 126). EU gas briefly from ~30 to >60 EUR/MWh. No day-precise spot figure without a primary source. | Volatile |
Snapshot of an active conflict — values can change daily. Trackers (MarineTraffic, JMIC, PortWatch) diverge; ranges, not false precision. Authoritative: UKMTO, IMO and flag states.
Why the Strait of Hormuz cannot be replaced
The strait between Oman and Iran connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It is deep and wide enough for the world’s largest crude tankers (VLCCs) and concentrates the exports of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Iran. In 2025, an average of around 20 million barrels of oil per day passed through — about 20% of global consumption and a quarter of seaborne oil trade (EIA/IEA). Add around one fifth of global LNG trade, almost entirely from Qatar.
Bypass options are structurally limited: the Saudi East-West pipeline and the UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah pipeline together offer an estimated 3.5–5 million b/d — a fraction of transit volumes. Qatar’s LNG has no bypass. Any disruption immediately affects global energy prices, freight rates and insurance costs.
Five phases of the crisis (2026 trajectory)
1) Blockade from 28 Feb 2026: transit collapses, insurers withdraw, DFC reinsurance (March) enables partial flows. 2) MoU/negotiation window from 17 June: brief recovery that does not hold. 3) July escalation: renewed tanker attacks, US strikes, war-risk 7.5–10%. 4) August diplomacy without physical normalisation: 60-day window expired around 18 Aug; UKMTO 115-26. 5) Late August: weekend low (13+4 transits), Iranian non-compliant list (~45–46 ships), OFAC Operation Economic Outcast — sanctions risk alongside the security risk.
For forwarders and shippers the trajectory matters: reading only the current snapshot underestimates how often "near-reopening" diplomacy and physical closure alternate. Operational decisions need UKMTO/JMIC primary sources and day-fresh carrier advisories — not headlines alone.
What the crisis means for forwarders and shippers
Directly affected are trades to and from Gulf ports (Jebel Ali, Dammam, Hamad, Kuwait, Bandar Abbas): carriers levy war-risk surcharges, cancel sailings or serve only ports outside the strait (e.g. Fujairah, Salalah, Duqm, Khor Fakkan). Bookings need longer lead times; hull insurers sometimes require day-by-day clearance.
Indirectly, the crisis hits virtually every supply chain via energy prices: BAF rises with oil, air freight via jet fuel, energy-intensive inputs pass on costs. For Gulf trades: review war/strike clauses, force majeure and price-adjustment clauses.
Operationally (July/August 2026): emergency freight sometimes up to ~USD 3,800/container for Gulf trades; extra cost for passage; congestion at Indian transhipment ports (Mundra, Nhava Sheva). JMIC expects traffic to remain reduced; mines and GNSS interference raise navigation risk. Since 24 Aug a sailing check is no longer enough: vessel and IMO number, owner, operator, charterer, consignee, banks and involved service providers should be screened — especially after last-minute vessel switches, ship-to-ship transfers and unusual payment routes. OFAC recommends enhanced screening of ships transiting Hormuz.
Where to find reliable situation updates
For operational decisions, primary sources matter: UKMTO (security warnings), JMIC (threat assessments), IMO (regulatory), EIA/IEA (transit/capacity data). AIS trackers and live pages give fast signals but diverge — always check against UKMTO/JMIC and carrier advisories. In an active conflict, figures become outdated within days.
Timeline: phases of the Hormuz crisis 2025–2026
Precursor · Twelve-day Israel-Iran air war
Already in 2025, war-risk premiums and reroutings showed how sensitively the strait reacts to escalation.
Phase 1 · War begins — near-total blockade
After US-Israeli strikes against Iran, transit collapses: Brent jumps 10–13%, EU gas prices briefly double; vessel movements fall by more than 90%.
P&I clubs cancel war-risk extensions
Leading insurers withdraw; at times more than 1,000 vessels are stuck inside the Gulf. Premiums reach 1–5% of hull value.
US launches USD 20bn maritime reinsurance programme
The DFC programme (lead: Chubb) assumes hull, liability and cargo risks for eligible transits, enabling a partial resumption of oil flows.
Phase 2 · US-Iran MoU: 60-day negotiation window
Both sides agree to negotiate a durable arrangement; transit traffic recovers temporarily — the window does not hold.
Phase 3 · Renewed escalation: tanker attacks, US strikes, renewed closure
Iran resumes tanker attacks, the US responds with strikes. In mid-July Iran announces the strait closed again; war-risk premiums reach 3–10% and concentrate at 7.5–10%.
AIS low: only 29 verified crossings in three days
MarineTraffic 24–26 July: 29 crossings. Estimates including AIS-off then ~30–40/day — later in August even lower.
Oman/GCC plan: voluntary transit fees; new Iranian threats
Oman delivers a GCC-backed joint-management plan (no Iranian sole control). Formal Iranian acceptance does not follow; the plan is overtaken in August by Tehran’s new conditions.
Phase 4 · Tanker attacks off Oman; diplomacy under fire
Two tankers are hit off Oman near the strait (one carrying gas). The physical situation remains highly volatile despite deal hopes.
Iran–Oman: draft agreement in "final stages" — no opening without US clearance
Coordinates for a transit route through Omani and Iranian waters are largely agreed; Tehran stresses the strait stays closed until Washington addresses sanctions, reparations and the blockade.
ADNOC tanker attack; JMIC "severe" / UKMTO 108-26
UAE accuses Iran of a missile strike on an ADNOC vessel (no injuries, return to Fujairah). JMIC: 84 incidents since 1 March; on 8 Aug only 8 cargo + 2 tankers; attack "highly likely".
Iran ties reopening to US concessions; oil prices rise
FM Araghchi: Iran–Oman near an agreement, but no reopening without US steps (sanctions, reparations). UKMTO: transit in the week to 7 Aug at ~4% of pre-war levels.
Mid-August attack wave: ADNOC tankers and bulk carriers
Several UAV and projectile hits on tankers and bulk carriers, including ADNOC vessels. JMIC keeps the threat at "severe"; traffic remains heavily suppressed.
60-day window ends; UKMTO 115-26 (crew casualty near Khasab)
No confirmed reopening after the negotiation window expired. UKMTO Warning 115-26: projectile strike outbound near Khasab, engine-room damage, crew casualty; Omani Coast Guard assisting. Commercial transit remains suppressed.
UKMTO VRA overview: AIS transits ~90% below pre-conflict
Official UKMTO overview (produced 21 Aug): AIS-detected transits about 90% below pre-conflict baselines and declining since the 24–26 Jun peak. Southern Omani route remains the highest-risk corridor (16 of 18 projectile strikes since 6 Jul). JMIC still "severe"; IMO TSS still suspended. No confirmed reopening.
Weekend low: 13 + 4 commodity transits
Kpler (preliminary): Saturday 13, Sunday 4 commodity transits — after 16 on Friday. AIS figures can understate dark transits. UKMTO week to 21 Aug: 89 exits, 103 entries; AIS still ~90% below pre-war.
Iran lists around 45–46 ships as non-compliant
Iran’s “Persian Gulf Strait Authority” publishes a non-compliant list (sources: 45 or 46 ships, including ADNOC, Bahri, Nakilat, Navig8, Stolt, Sinokor). Threat: fines, detention, confiscation; STS with listed ships can also trigger listing.
OFAC launches Operation Economic Outcast
US Treasury: nearly 60 persons, firms and vessels newly listed; sectoral determinations for shipping, aviation, gold, technology and digital assets. OFAC expressly warns of sanctions risk on Hormuz transit and Iranian passage or insurance services.
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Next steps
Matching tools and partners
Frequently asked questions
Is the Strait of Hormuz currently closed?›
As of 25 Aug 2026: commercially, effectively yes — high-risk, transit heavily suppressed. UKMTO (VRA 21 Aug): AIS-detected transits about 90% below pre-conflict (week 89 out / 103 in). Weekend 22–23 Aug (Kpler): 13 and 4 commodity transits. The 60-day window expired around 18 Aug. A few ships still transit under high risk. Authoritative: UKMTO/JMIC and carrier advisories.
When will the Strait of Hormuz reopen?›
Not confirmed. The 60-day negotiation window expired around 18 Aug 2026 — without a confirmed reopening. Tehran still ties any opening to US concessions. Earlier windows (June MoU) did not hold. While JMIC remains "severe" and war-risk ~7.5–10%, commercial normalisation is not expected.
How much oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz?›
Under normal operations (H1 2025), an average of 20.9 million barrels per day according to the EIA — around 20% of global consumption. Kpler puts clearance over the 60-day window at about 6.1 million b/d — around 40% of the ~15 million b/d Hormuz averaged in crude in 2025. That is a window average, not a daily figure. Since February 2026 actual throughput has been massively suppressed.
What does war-risk insurance cost for a Hormuz transit?›
July/August 2026: typically 7.5–10% of hull value per transit; VLCC cover sometimes exceeds USD 10 million. Pre-war around 0.25% (approx. USD 250,000). Rates change with the situation, sometimes daily.
Are there alternative routes around the Strait of Hormuz?›
Only to a limited extent: East-West (Saudi) and Habshan–Fujairah (UAE) together offer an estimated 3.5–5 million b/d — a fraction of ~20 million b/d. No bypass for Qatar LNG. Container trades can partially shift to Fujairah, Salalah, Duqm, Khor Fakkan.
What should forwarders do now on Gulf trades?›
Check UKMTO/JMIC and carrier advisories daily; show war-risk and emergency surcharges transparently in quotes; plan alternate ports outside the strait; update force majeure and war/strike clauses; brief customers on transit-time and price volatility. Screen vessel, IMO, owner, operator, charterer and payment routes against OFAC and the Iranian non-compliant list. No passage without current insurer and carrier clearance.
What sanctions risks apply to a Hormuz transit?›
Since 24 Aug 2026 (OFAC Operation Economic Outcast), payments or services around a Hormuz transit can trigger US sanctions risk — including Iranian passage or insurance services. OFAC newly listed nearly 60 persons, firms and vessels and expanded shipping, aviation, gold, technology and digital-asset sectors. In parallel, Iran threatens listed ships (around 45–46) with detention and confiscation; STS with those ships can also trigger listing. This is not legal advice — OFAC, the flag state and your own compliance are authoritative.
Sources & authoritative references
- OfficialEIA — World Oil Transit Chokepoints
- AuthorityIEA — Strait of Hormuz (Oil Security)
- OfficialUKMTO — Maritime Security Warnings
- OfficialUKMTO — VRA Overview (produced 21 Aug 2026)
- OfficialIMO — Maritime Security
- AuthorityUNCTAD — Review of Maritime Transport
- ReferenceAl Jazeera — Oil prices & Iranian Hormuz demands (10 Aug 2026)
- ReferenceGulf News / JMIC — Hormuz threat severe, ADNOC tanker attack (Aug 2026)
- ReferencegCaptain / Reuters — Iran ties Hormuz reopening to US concessions (10 Aug 2026)
- ReferencegCaptain — ADNOC vessels attacked, Hormuz still severely disrupted (mid-Aug 2026)
- ReferenceThe National — War-Risk Premium Report (17.07.2026)
- ReferenceThe National — Oman steps up Hormuz diplomacy (28.07.2026)
- ReferenceFrachtportal News — Indien: Containerstau und Frachtraten steigen (22.07.2026)
- OfficialUS Treasury — Operation Economic Outcast (24 Aug 2026)
- OfficialOFAC — Hormuz transit sanctions guidance (24 Aug 2026)
- ReferenceReuters / The Hindu — Weekend Hormuz transits (24 Aug 2026)
- ReferencegCaptain — Iran non-compliant vessel list (23 Aug 2026)
- ReferenceFrachtportal News — Hormuz praktisch leer, AIS ~90 % unter Normalniveau (25.08.2026)
Go deeper on Freight Academy
Glossary: Strait of Hormuz (definition & facts)Glossary: War risk insuranceGlossary: War risk surcharge (WRS)Glossary: Chokepoint (maritime bottleneck)Sea freight knowledge hub: containers, B/L, transit timesTransit times: what reroutings mean for lead timesCargo insurance: understanding ICC clauses & war riskGlossary: Force majeureGlossary: Sanctions listGlossary: Sanctions supervision