US Tariffs 2026: Current Rates, Legal Status and Impact

Since 24 July 2026 at 00:01 ET, the Section 301 forced-labour duty applies to nearly all imports — on top of regular MFN rates, product-specific Section 232 duties (steel, aluminium, copper, autos) and existing Section 301 China tariffs. The Section 122 baseline duty expired the same day as scheduled. Nothing changes for customs valuation or HS classification; the Section 301 duty is levied as an additional charge on the customs value. Authoritative: Federal Register notice and USTR final action of 23/28 July 2026.

Country differentiation is critical for freight forwarders: the EU and Taiwan pay 10% net-of-MFN; Switzerland, Japan and South Korea pay 12.5% net-of-MFN (the regular MFN rate is credited; only if the existing rate falls below 12.5% is the difference levied as the Section 301 duty). China, Brazil, Vietnam and others pay a flat 12.5% on top of existing Section 301 duties. In parallel, the overcapacity 301 investigation of 16 economies continues — as of 25 Aug 2026 still without tariffs.

Canada is the latest special case: under forced-labour 301 the rate is 10% with a CUSMA carve-out (only if origin is validly claimed). Since 22 Aug 2026, 50% Section 338 duties (Tariff Act of 1930, Proclamations 11046–11048) also apply to listed goods — with no CUSMA exemption. Energy, potash, fish, critical minerals and goods already under Section 232 are excluded. On 25 Aug 2026 Finance Canada ordered the counter-tariffs: 15, 25 and 50% on US-origin goods covering $27.6bn — matching the US rate, in force 8 Sept 2026 00:01. Focus: steel/aluminium (25→50%), dairy, appliances, farm equipment, paper, plastics, electronics. Existing auto counter-tariffs continue. Goods in transit on the effective date are excluded. Authoritative: Finance Canada list, White House fact sheet and USTR statement.

1) IEEPA global tariffs (from April 2025): blanket "reciprocal tariffs" under the emergency statute — struck down by the Supreme Court on 20 Feb 2026 (Learning Resources v. Trump). 2) Section 122 bridge (24 Feb–24 July 2026): 10% baseline duty with a statutory 150-day limit as interim. 3) Section 301 forced labour (since 24 July 2026): durable, procedurally backed duties on 60 economies — with the overcapacity probe in parallel. Since 22 Aug, Section 338 (50%) also applies to selected Canadian listed goods.

The sequence explains why importers in 2026 juggle three legal regimes and refund processes at once: IEEPA refunds via CBP CAPE (~USD 100bn certified, latest declaration 4 Aug), expired Section 122 entries and ongoing forced-labour 301 payments — plus looming overcapacity duties. Knowing only the current rate misses the context for protest deadlines, Incoterms and price-adjustment clauses.

For exports from the EU, Switzerland and the rest of Europe, the basic rule stands: the US importer of record owes the duty, but tariffs directly affect price negotiations, Incoterms choice and margins. Under DDP terms the seller carries the full duty-cost risk — with parallel CIT suits and open overcapacity 301, DDP should be calculated cautiously or hedged with price-adjustment clauses.

Operationally important: proofs of origin and correct HS classification determine the applicable rate, because the Section 301 duties differentiate by country (10% EU/Taiwan vs. 12.5% Switzerland/Japan/South Korea vs. a flat +12.5% surcharge for China et al.). Transshipment via third countries to avoid duties is under heightened CBP scrutiny and risks punitive duties and penalties.

Swiss exporters face a specific regime: Switzerland is included at 12.5% net-of-MFN, which — given low MFN rates — amounts to nearly the full surcharge in practice. USTR’s exceptions list (HTSUS codes 9903.05.73, .74 and .98) lists goods exempt or reduced to 10% — check every HS heading in the product range.

IEEPA, Section 122 and Section 301 differ fundamentally in duration and legal vulnerability: IEEPA tariffs have been ruled out by the Supreme Court since February 2026. Section 122 is capped at 150 days and 15% and has expired. Section 301 has neither a rate ceiling nor a fixed end date (four-year review) and is considered procedurally more robust — which is why it is the administration’s target instrument. That durability is the core of the "pretext" suits at the CIT: plaintiffs see forced-labour 301 as a relaunch of the struck-down global tariffs under another name.