# Bab al-Mandab, As of September 19: The IMO Balance Sheet and Differentiation from Hormuz **Category:** Operational Alerts | **Source:** Le Monde / IMO / Freightos | **Published:** 2026-09-21 | **Updated:** 2026-09-26 **Tags:** Bab al-Mandab, Rotes Meer, Suezkanal, Huthi, Seefracht, Kap der Guten Hoffnung, Frachtraten, Kriegsrisiko, Lieferkette, Logistik News, Transport News, Fracht News, Speditions News, Supply Chain News, Zoll News, Frachtportal News, Schienentransport, Digitalisierung > Update of the situation report from September 14: the IMO assessment from September 17, the delimitation to Hormuz, and what this means for confirmed bookings. --- The deterioration of the situation at the southern entrance to the Red Sea and which alternative routes remain has been described since mid-September. This article updates the situation picture to the status of 19 September 2026. Three points are new: the assessment drawn by IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez on 17 September 2026; clarification of which chokepoint the core figures actually apply to; and the observation that a substantial portion of Asia-Europe services are now using the passage again. The IMO has confirmed eighty attacks on merchant vessels and at least 22 seafarers killed since 28 February 2026. Crucial for route assessment is where these attacks took place: the figure refers to the Strait of Hormuz and its vicinity, not the Bab al-Mandab. The Red Sea is listed separately by the IMO. In the most recent Houthi attack on a merchant vessel on 11 August 2026, four seafarers lost their lives. Those who attribute the eighty attacks to Bab al-Mandab are weighting the risk at the wrong chokepoint. Along the Yemeni Red Sea coast, Houthi control has further consolidated according to reports through 18 September 2026. The strait is not thereby blocked, but is already under constant observation and threat. At the same time, part of traffic is again passing through. Freightos reports approximately 19 percent of Asia-Europe volumes via the Red Sea for September 2026, carried by three of the four alliances. This is not a signal of a reliably open route: shipping lines decide based on vessel, cargo, flag, insurance, and current security situation, and a short-term rerouting remains possible at any time. The alternative remains the route around Cape of Good Hope. What matters for calculation is less the principle than the range: Le Monde cites at least ten additional days, Al Jazeera puts the surcharge for affected services at over twenty transit days. Those planning only with the lower figure underestimate the variation depending on service and port sequence. For Swiss shippers, therefore, the problem is less the route itself than its predictability. A confirmed booking can show a schedule via Suez and later still be rerouted to the Cape route. Before confirmation, it should be clarified whether the freight forwarder expressly reserves the right to reroute around Africa, which bunker, war risk, and rerouting surcharges then apply, and whether cargo insurance includes or excludes war risks. --- Dispatchers should not simply adopt the booked transit time for Asia trades, but should build in a buffer for a possible Africa bypass—even if the booked service is currently among the approximately 19 percent that transit through the Red Sea. Shippers should verify latest delivery dates, safety stocks, and insurance coverage. In offers, it must be clear whether bunker surcharges, war risk surcharges, or rerouting surcharges can be levied subsequently. For important shipments, an alternative plan via air freight or rail is worthwhile, even if these solutions are more expensive. In short: The Suez route is not broadly closed, but remains too unreliable for firm transit time commitments. --- Bab al-Mandab connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. The passage is part of the shortest sea route between Asia and Europe. The detour around the Cape of Good Hope extends journeys by at least ten days according to Le Monde; Al Jazeera states over twenty additional transit days for affected services. Individual container services continued to use the strait in September 2026. According to Freightos, approximately 19 percent of Asia-Europe volumes transited the Red Sea again in September 2026, carried by three of the four alliances. The IMO confirmed in its statement of September 17, 2026, eighty attacks on merchant vessels in and around the Strait of Hormuz since February 28, 2026. These eighty attacks do not refer to Bab al-Mandab. The IMO reports at least 22 seafarers killed during the same period. The IMO also recently confirmed new fatal attacks in the Red Sea: In the latest Houthi attack on a merchant vessel on August 11, 2026, four seafarers were killed. Shipping lines continuously reassess routing decisions based on security conditions and insurance coverage. Additional sources for cross-verification: Al Jazeera: Red Sea nations watch as Houthis seize Bab al-Mandeb strait gCaptain: IMO Sounds Alarm as Attacks on Merchant Ships Spread Across Global Trade Routes The Maritime Executive: IMO Renews Call to Stop Attacks on Seafarers and Commercial Ships ## Related Entities ### Countries - [Egypt](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/information/land/eg) - [Eritrea](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/information/land/er) - [Djibouti](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/information/land/dj) - [Saudi Arabia](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/information/land/sa) - [Yemen](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/information/land/ye) ### Seaports - [As Suways (EG SUZ)](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/information/seaports/as-suways-port-eg-suz) - [Jiddah (SA JED)](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/information/seaports/jiddah-port-sa-jed) - [Yanbu (SA YBI)](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/information/seaports/yanbu-port-sa-ybi) ### Glossary - [Bunker Adjustment Factor](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/bunker-adjustment-factor) - [Booking](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/booking) - [Container](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/container) - [Shipping company](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/shipping-company) - [Sea freight](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/sea-freight) - [Supply Chain](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/supply-chain) - [Transit time](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/transit-time) - [Cargo Transport Insurance](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/cargo-transport-insurance) - [Strait of Hormuz](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/strait-of-hormuz) - [rerouting](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/rerouting) - [Ingress](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/ingress) - [alternate route](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/alternate-route) - [Carrier](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/carrier-3) - [War Risk Surcharge](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/war-risk-surcharge) - [Chokepoint](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/chokepoint) - [Cape Route](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/cape-route) - [Bab el-Mandeb](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/bab-el-mandeb) - [Suez Canal](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/glossary/suez-canal) --- *Canonical URL: [https://www.freight-academy.com/en/news/bab-al-mandab-wird-erneut-zum-risiko-fuer-den-welthandel-20260919072852](https://www.freight-academy.com/en/news/bab-al-mandab-wird-erneut-zum-risiko-fuer-den-welthandel-20260919072852)* *Markdown mirror: [https://www.freight-academy.com/api/md/news/en/bab-al-mandab-wird-erneut-zum-risiko-fuer-den-welthandel-20260919072852](https://www.freight-academy.com/api/md/news/en/bab-al-mandab-wird-erneut-zum-risiko-fuer-den-welthandel-20260919072852)*